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Abstract:  
We analyze firms’ entry, production and hedging decisions under imperfect competition. 
We consider an oligopoly industry producing a homogeneous output in which risk-averse 
firms face an entry cost upon entering the industry, and then compete in Cournot with 
one another. Each firm faces uncertainty in the input cost when making production 
decision, and has access to the futures market to hedge the random cost. We provide 
two sets of results. First, under general assumptions about risk preferences, demand, 
and uncertainty, we characterize the unique equilibrium. In contrast to previous results in 
the literature (without entry), production and output price depend on uncertainty and risk 
aversion. Specifically, when entry is endogenized and the futures price is not actuarially 
fair, access to the futures market does not lead to separation. Second, to study the 
effect of access to the futures market on entry and production, we restrict attention to 
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences, a linear demand, and a normal 
distribution for the spot price. In general, the effect of access to the futures market on 
the number of firms and production is ambiguous.  
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1 Introduction
Recent ﬁnancial literature on ﬁrms’ risk management of market risk has
focused on the determinants of hedging and the economic value of ﬁnancial
coverage. The two main questions in this literature are: Why do ﬁrms hedge?
and Does hedging increase the economic value of the ﬁrms? Firms’ hedging is
explained by managerial risk aversion (Stulz, 1990; Tufano, 1996) or market
imperfections such as corporate income taxation (Smith and Stulz, 1985;
Graham and Smith, 1999; Graham and Rogers, 2002), ﬁnancial distress costs
(Smith and Stulz, 1985), corporate governance (Dionne and Triki, 2013),
investment opportunity costs (Froot et al., 1993; Froot and Stein, 1998), and
information asymmetries (DeMarzo and Duﬃe, 1991). The empirical eﬀect of
hedging on ﬁrm value is rather mixed (Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011; Campello
et al., 2011).
Another strand of the literature analyzes the joint production and hedging
decisions of the ﬁrm under uncertainty about output price (Holthausen, 1979;
Feder et al., 1980). The main result from this literature is that optimal output
production is independent of the probability distribution of the output price
and the manager’s risk aversion. The distribution of the output price and
risk aversion have an eﬀect only on ﬁrms’ involvement in futures trading.
Hence, with access to the futures market, uncertainty does not introduce
any eﬃciency loss in production. The same separation result is obtained
under perfect competition and input price uncertainty (Holthausen, 1979;
Katz and Paroush, 1979; Paroush and Wolf, 1992). Paroush and Wolf (1992)
show, however, that the separation result does not hold in the presence of
basis risk, while Anderson and Danthine (1981) obtain a similar negative
result with production uncertainty. Diﬀerent extensions have been proposed
by considering multiple risky inputs, background risk, and joint output price
and input price uncertainty.1
Although there are many contributions regarding ﬁrms’ hedging in both
literatures, to our knowledge there are few analyses of ﬁrms’ hedging behav-
1See Viaene and Zilcha (1998) for instance. See also Alghalith (2008) for a review of
the literature with competitive markets.
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ior under imperfect competition, and none that considers entry in the output
market.2 We propose to ﬁll the gap by analyzing ﬁrms’ entry, production
and hedging decisions under imperfect competition. Speciﬁcally, we consider
an oligopoly industry producing a homogeneous output in which risk-averse
ﬁrms face an entry cost upon entering the output industry, and, then, com-
pete in Cournot with one another.3 Each ﬁrm faces uncertainty in the input
cost when choosing production, and has access to the futures market to hedge
the random cost. There is only one source of risk in our analysis.4 One ap-
plication of our model is the airline market for which it has been veriﬁed in
empirical investigations of the U.S. airline industry that Cournot competi-
tion is present (Brander and Zhang, 1990; Fisher and Kamerschen, 2003). In
this market, airline companies face future fuel price uncertainty when they
make their optimal routes decisions for the next few months, and purchase
futures contracts for jet fuel (Morrell and Swan, 2006).5 Here, entering or
exiting the output market is mainly interpreted as route decisions.
We provide two sets of results. First, under general assumptions about
2There are three notable exceptions for imperfect competition. First, Eldor and Zilcha
(1990) study the hedging behavior of an oligopoly under uncertainty in the output sector.
However, while the spot price is endogenous (and the ﬁrms exercise market power under
uncertainty), the futures (or forward) price is exogenous and ﬁxed. In other words, the
ﬁrms exercise market power in the spot output market, but behave perfectly competitively
for the futures market of the same good. In addition, Eldor and Zilcha (1990) do not
consider entry, which is our main focus in this paper. Second, in a very diﬀerent setting,
Allaz and Villa (1993) isolate the strategic reasons for using futures contracts. By selling
futures contracts, Cournot ﬁrms attach a lower value to a high spot price and commit
to aggressive behavior on the spot price yielding more production at a lower price in
equilibrium, which beneﬁts consumers but not producers. Third, the eﬀect of strategic
hedging on Cournot and Bertrand competition is studied in Le´autier and Rochet (2012).
We compare Le´autier and Rochet (2012) model with our model and results later in the
introduction.
3In this study, we assume that the ﬁrms have a concave payoﬀ due to managerial risk
aversion. Concavity can be explained by diﬀerent market imperfections. See Froot et al.
(1993) for a discussion.
4For the case of two types of risk (e.g., a risk that can be hedged through a ﬁnan-
cial derivative and a risk that can be insured by an insurance contract), see Rochet and
Villeneuve (2011).
5Fuel cost represents about 15% of the airlines’ costs. Other costs are usually less
volatile so hedging fuel costs guarantees stable proﬁts. Usually, airlines do not hedge
business cycle risk. Airline companies can also purchase other derivatives products such
as options and even collars. These options would introduce more ﬂexibility for the ﬁrm at
a higher cost, but would not aﬀect the main results of the paper.
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risk preferences, demand, and uncertainty, we show that there exists a unique
equilibrium in which a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms enter the market as long as the
entry cost is not too high (the standard case) or not too low. Indeed, if
the cost of entry in the output industry is too low, an inﬁnite number of
ﬁrms may enter the output industry and engage in speculation in the futures
market, which yields the competitive outcome in the real sector. That is,
the price of the output is equal to the marginal cost and the ﬁrms only
make proﬁts from speculating on the input market. We also show that, in
contrast to previous results in the literature, production and output price
depend on uncertainty and risk preferences. In particular, production and
output price depend on the distribution of the spot price and risk aversion.
The key element is that the entry decision coupled with a non-actuarially
fair futures price limits the ability of the ﬁrms to adjust their production
decisions, which implies that output is no longer independent of uncertainty
and risk aversion. One implication is that access to the futures market alters
the comparative analysis. If there is no access to the futures market, either a
mean-preserving increase in risk or an increase in risk aversion induces each
ﬁrm to produce less. If there is access to the futures market, such changes
imply an increase (rather than a decrease) in per-ﬁrm production.6
The second set of results concern the eﬀect of access to the futures market
on entry, production, and prices. To study this eﬀect, we restrict attention
to constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences, a linear demand,
and a normal distribution for the spot input price. The eﬀect of access to
the futures market on the number of ﬁrms is ambiguous depending on the
value of the futures price and the parameters of the model. Further, the
equilibrium number of ﬁrms is convex in the futures price when the ﬁrms
partially hedge. In particular, an increase in the futures price of the input
can yield an increase in the number of ﬁrms in the output sector. This is
due to the fact that an increase in the futures price induces ﬁrms to produce
less, which reduces the market externality in a Cournot game and induces
6The result without ﬁnancial access is consistent with classical results obtained in a
static environment (i.e., without entry decision) for perfect competition (Sandmo, 1971;
Batra and Ullah, 1974) and quantity-setting monopoly (Leland, 1972).
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more ﬁrms to enter while hedging their cost. Moreover, hedging induces each
risk-averse ﬁrm to produce more.
As noted, very few articles study the interaction of real and ﬁnancial
activities when the ﬁrms exert market power. One exception is a recent paper
by Le´autier and Rochet (2012) which studies the eﬀect of committing to a
hedging strategy on production or pricing strategies. Speciﬁcally, Le´autier
and Rochet (2012) considers a two-stage game in which each ﬁrm commits to
a hedging strategy in the ﬁrst stage and then chooses production or pricing
strategies in the second stage. As in our model, the ﬁrms have market power
in the output sector but are perfectly competitive in the input market. There
are however main diﬀerences in the setups as well as in the issues studied.
Regarding the model, Le´autier and Rochet (2012) considers a market with
a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms, each one committing to a hedging strategy before
production or pricing strategies. In our model, entry is a decision variable in
the ﬁrst stage whereas hedging and production are chosen simultaneously in
the second stage.
Beyond the diﬀerences in modeling, we study diﬀerent and complemen-
tary aspects of the link between real and ﬁnancial activities when the ﬁrms
exert market power. Le´autier and Rochet (2012) shows that strategic hedg-
ing (when used as a strategic commitment device) has a profound eﬀect on
the real decisions of the ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, under actuarially fair pricing,
when the ﬁrm commits to a hedging strategy, hedging toughens quantity
competition, but softens price competition. We also consider issues related
to risk management and real activities but of diﬀerent nature. Speciﬁcally,
we show that the separation result does not hold in the long-run when mar-
ket structure is endogenized and the futures price is not actuarially fair.7 We
then study the eﬀect of access to the futures market on entry and production
decisions.8
7As noted, separation means that production decisions are independent of uncertainty
and risk preferences, and depend only on the futures price (Danthine, 1973; Holthausen,
1979; Feder et al., 1980).
8In other words, we show how commitment in entry removes the separation result
obtained in the literature (i.e., production strategies depend on uncertainty and risk pref-
erences in the long run) whereas Le´autier and Rochet (2012) shows that commitment in
hedging has a profound eﬀect on Bertrand or Cournot competition.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and de-
ﬁnes the equilibrium. Section 3 states the equilibrium and presents results
related to the issue of separation. Section 4 discusses the eﬀect of access
to futures market on entry. Section 5 concludes the paper. Main proofs are
found in the Appendix of this paper whereas the remaining proofs and exten-
sions are found in the online Appendix provided by Dionne and Santugini
(2014).
2 Model
In this section, we present the model and deﬁne the free-entry equilibrium
with access to the futures market. In the next sections, we analyze the
equilibrium. Under a general characterization of the unique equilibrium, we
show that the entry decision links production and output price to uncertainty
and risk aversion.
2.1 Preliminaries
We embed access to the futures market in a two-stage entry game. At the ﬁrst
stage, all potential ﬁrms decide whether to enter an industry in the output
sector. Each entering ﬁrm faces an exogenous entry cost.9 At the second
stage, all ﬁrms that have entered make production and ﬁnancial decisions
while competing in Cournot in the output sector. The ﬁrms face uncertainty
in the input price, but have access to perfectly competitive spot and futures
markets. Figure 1 describes the timeline of the model.10
We now describe the second stage of the game. In an industry with J
ﬁrms, ﬁrm j produces qj ≥ 0 units of output and faces the inverse demand
p = P
(∑J
k=1 qk
)
where p is the output price and qk is the output sold by ﬁrm
9The case of no entry cost is excluded. In the data, industries with access to and
participation in the futures market generally comprise a small number of large ﬁrms. See
Campello et al. (2011). It is well documented in the literature that large ﬁrms hedge
(Stulz, 1996).
10We abstract from bankruptcy or solvency problems that could arise after the spot
input price is realized. Because we use futures contracts, there is no credit risk in the
ﬁnancial market.
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Stage 1:
All potential
ﬁrms decide
entry.
Stage 2:
All entering
ﬁrms make
production
and ﬁnancial
decisions.
All ﬁrms observe the entry cost, the futures
price and the distribution of the spot price.
The spot price is realized and trading
occurs in the output and input markets.
Figure 1: Timeline
k. The technology to transform the input into the output is assumed to be
linear and deterministic. A unit of input can be purchased in the spot market
at price S˜, which is unknown at the time of setting output.11 In addition to
the spot market, there is a futures market for the input. A futures contract
can be purchased at known price F for delivery of one unit of input.
The decisions of the ﬁrm can be summarized by two variables: one related
to production and another one related to ﬁnancial activity. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrm
j sets output qj ≥ 0 and chooses the hedge coverage ωj ∈ R for the random
cost so that ﬁrm j purchases (1− ωj)qj units of input in the spot market at
the random spot input price S˜, and buys futures contracts at the futures price
F for the remaining ωjqj units of input.
12 Given production and ﬁnancial
decisions, the random proﬁt of ﬁrm j when there are J ﬁrms in the industry
is
π
(
J, qj , ωj,
∑J
k =j
qk, S˜, F
)
= P
(
qj+
∑J
k =j
qk
)
qj− S˜(1−ωj)qj−Fωjqj (1)
where the ﬁrms compete in Cournot in the output market, but are price-
takers in the (spot and futures) input markets.13
11A tilde sign distinguishes a random variable from a realization.
12In other words, ﬁrm j purchases xj ≡ (1−ωj)qj units of input in the spot market, and
the remaining yj ≡ ωjqj units are purchased in the futures market. Hence, qj = xj + yj
units of output are produced.
13This situation is representative of industries that participate in the futures input
markets. For instance, while airline companies have market power in providing their
services, they cannot have an eﬀect on the ﬁnancial prices of the futures contracts for fuel
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Firms may engage in various types of ﬁnancial activities. Speciﬁcally,
ﬁrm j may decide not to access the futures market, i.e., ωj = 0. It may
also partially hedge (ωj ∈ (0, 1)) or fully hedge (ωj = 1).14 It may ﬁnally
engage in two forms of speculation, i.e., buying or selling futures contracts
to generate pure ﬁnancial proﬁts without any link to proﬁts derived from real
production. First, when ωj < 0, ﬁrm j sells futures contracts at price F
which are deliverable by purchasing the input in the spot market.15 Second,
when ωj > 1, ﬁrm j fully hedges, and buys additional units of input in the
futures market for resale in the spot market.16 While ﬁrms whose main ac-
tivity is production rarely speculate (e.g., the board often prevents the ﬁrm’s
managing team from speculating), it occurs and has occurred (Stulz, 1996).
For our analysis, it turns out that allowing ﬁrms to engage in speculation
simpliﬁes the characterization of the equilibrium (i.e., no corner solution),
and, more importantly, has no eﬀect on most of our results.17
Note that the literature linking real decisions with access to futures mar-
kets uses the term speculation in two distinct ways. In Holthausen (1979) and
Feder et al. (1980), ωj ∈ (0, 1) is interpreted as partial hedging or hedging
less than the entire quantity, whereas the ﬁrm speculates when ωj /∈ [0, 1].
However, in Anderson and Danthine (1983), a diﬀerent interpretation is of-
fered. Speciﬁcally, ωj ∈ (0, 1) is interpreted as speculation.18 To understand
because many other industries interact in these futures market.
14Full hedging means that the input is purchased only in the futures market, whereas,
under partial hedging, the input is purchased in both the spot and the futures markets.
15Consistent with Footnote 12, ωj < 0 implies that xj > 0, yj < 0, so that production
is qj = xj + yj < xj because some of the input purchased in the spot market is used for
delivery via the futures market whereas the remaining input is used for production.
16Consistent with Footnote 12, ωj > 1 implies that xj < 0, yj > 0.
17Assuming CARA preferences, a linear demand, and a normally distributed spot price,
online Appendix 5 provides a full characterization of the equilibrium when the ﬁrms have
restricted access to the futures market, i.e., the ﬁrms may hedge but cannot speculate.
18On pp. 375-376 of Anderson and Danthine (1983) (in the case of farmers selling output
on spot and futures markets), it is written farmers hedge the totality of their output prior
to readjusting their position, as speculators, on the basis of the expected futures-cash price
diﬀerential.
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the Anderson and Danthine (1983) interpretation, (1) is rewritten as
π
(
J, qj , ωj,
∑J
k =j
qk, S˜, F
)
= P
(
qj +
∑J
k =j
qk
)
qj −Fqj +(F − S˜)(1−ωj)qj .
(2)
From (2), the proﬁt of a ﬁrm is the sum of the real proﬁt under full hedging
and the ﬁnancial payoﬀ from not hedging a fraction 1− ωj of the input, i.e.,
the terms P(qj +
∑J
k =j qk)qj − Fqj and (F − S˜)(1− ωj)qj , respectively. Al-
though expressions (1) and (2) are equivalent, expression (2) is an alternative
decomposition of proﬁts, which oﬀers another interpretation for the behav-
ior of the ﬁrm. That is, the ﬁrm purchases all input for production in the
futures market and takes advantage of any opportunities in expected returns
between spot and futures markets. In our paper, we refer to speculation as
in Holthausen (1979) and Feder et al. (1980).
2.2 Assumptions
Each ﬁrm is managed by a risk-averse oﬃcer (e.g., the CEO) whose objective
is to maximize the ﬁrm’s expected utility of proﬁt over output and hedge
coverage. The next four assumptions hold for the remainder of the paper.
Assumption 2.1. The utility function for proﬁt π is u(π) such that u′ >
0, u′′ < 0.
Assumption 2.2. Inverse demand p = P(Q), Q ≡∑Jk=1 qk is twice contin-
uously diﬀerentiable such that
1. P(0) < ∞,
2. P ′(Q) < 0 in the interval for which p = P(Q) > 0, and
3. P ′′(Q)qj + P ′(Q) < 0 for all j.
Assumption 2.3. The p.d.f. of the random spot price S˜ is φ(S) for S ∈
(0, P(0)).
Assumption 2.4. F ∈ (0, P(0)).
10
We make three comments regarding our assumptions. First, Assump-
tions 2.1 and 2.2 yield a unique number of ﬁrms entering the market in the
ﬁrst stage of the game and ensures the existence of a unique Cournot equi-
librium in the second stage. In particular, Condition 3 in Assumption 2.2
ensures that a ﬁrm’s best-response function to the total output of the other
ﬁrms have a nonpositive slope greater than −1. Second, from Assump-
tions 2.3 and 2.4, there always exists an output price high enough to cover
the input cost using both input markets so that trivial cases for which the
output market does not exist are ignored. Third, Assumption 2.4 implies
that no restriction is imposed on the futures price.19 Speciﬁcally, in addition
to having an actuarially fair futures price, i.e., F = ES˜ where E is the expec-
tation operator, the futures market may be either in normal backwardation
(i.e., F < ES˜) or in contango (i.e., F > ES˜).20
2.3 Deﬁnition of Equilibrium
Deﬁnition 2.5 provides the free-entry equilibrium with access to the futures
market, i.e., ωj ∈ R. The term free entry means that there is no institutional
constraint on ﬁrms entering the market, i.e., ﬁrms may enter the market in
response to proﬁt opportunities. The equilibrium consists of the number of
ﬁrms entering the industry, J∗; the Cournot strategies, {q∗(J∗), ω∗(J∗)}; and
the output price, p∗(J∗).21 To simplify the notation, the integral over S is
replaced by the expectation operator E over the random spot price S˜. Note
that we choose to model the entry cost as an opportunity entry cost. Here,
K > 0 is the entry cost and u(K) is the utility level corresponding to the
19To discard uninteresting cases in which the ﬁrms do not produce, the futures price is
restricted to be below the reservation price of the output.
20The futures markets for oil were in contango in 2011. This situation is gener-
ally explained by the recent political situation in Arab countries. Other futures mar-
kets (e.g., gold and silver) were in normal backwardation during the same period. See
http://www.zacks.com/stock/news/57493/Backwardation-and-Contango.
21Since the equilibrium is symmetric, the summation operator is no longer needed, i.e.,∑J∗
k =j q
∗(J∗) = (J∗ − 1)q∗(J∗).
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best alternative activity.22
Deﬁnition 2.5. The tuple {J∗, q∗(J∗), ω∗(J∗), p∗(J∗)} is an equilibrium if
1. For all j, given J∗ ≥ 1 and the strategies {q∗(J∗), ω∗(J∗)} of ﬁrm k = j,
q∗(J∗) and ω∗(J∗) solve
max
qj≥0,ωj∈R
Eu(π(J∗, qj , ωj, (J∗ − 1)q∗(J∗), S˜, F )). (5)
2. Given J∗ ≥ 1 and q∗(J∗), p∗(J∗) = P(J∗q∗(J∗)).
3. Given the strategies {q∗(J∗), ω∗(J∗)}, J∗ ≥ 0 is an integer that satisﬁes
Eu(π(J∗, q∗(J∗), ω∗(J∗), (J∗ − 1)q∗(J∗), S˜, F )) ≥ u(K) (6)
for J∗ ≥ 1, and
Eu(π(J∗ + 1, q∗(J∗ + 1), ω∗(J∗ + 1), J∗q∗(J∗ + 1), S˜, F )) < u(K) (7)
for J∗ ≥ 0.
From Deﬁnition 2.5, Conditions 1 and 2 deﬁne the Cournot equilibrium
at stage 2 of the game. Condition 3 is related to the entry decision at stage
1. Speciﬁcally, the equilibrium number of ﬁrms in the industry is such that,
from (6), each entering ﬁrm receives an expected utility weakly greater than
the utility derived from the best alternative activity, and, from (7), further
entry yields an expected utility strictly smaller than the utility derived from
the best alternative activity.
In our model, the ﬁrms do not enter the product market in order to have
access to the futures market. Their main expertise is to oﬀer goods and
22More generally, (6) and (7) could have been replaced by
Eu(π(J∗, q∗(J∗), ω∗(J∗), (J∗ − 1)q∗(J∗), S˜, F )−K) ≥ u¯ (3)
and
Eu(π(J∗ + 1, q∗(J∗ + 1), ω∗(J∗ + 1), J∗q∗(J∗ + 1), S˜, F )−K) < u¯ (4)
where K is the setup cost and u¯ is the opportunity cost. Our approach simpliﬁes the
analysis and has no bearing on the results.
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services in the output market. In other words, if the ﬁrms do not produce,
they have no need or demand for futures contracts. The ﬁrms face a risk
emanating from the product market and, due to risk aversion, they develop
a demand for ﬁnancial products. However, the ﬁrms are not on the supply
side of ﬁnancial markets because they do not have any expertise to enter
into the ﬁnancial market and to become an investment bank or an insurance
company. For example, they do not have the actuarial expertise to compute
insurance premiums for pure or accident risks or to underwrite debt contracts
or derivative products.23 Hence, these ﬁrms have no intention or ability to
trade ﬁnancial assets if they do not enter the product market.
3 Equilibrium and Separation
In this section, we provide a general characterization of the free-entry equi-
librium with access to the futures market. We also discuss the eﬀect of en-
try on the separation property as deﬁned in the literature (Danthine, 1973;
Holthausen, 1979; Feder et al., 1980; Viaene and Zilcha, 1998).
Deﬁnition 3.1. There is separation when production and output price are
independent of uncertainty and risk aversion.
We show that, whenever the free-entry equilibrium exists and the futures
price is not actuarially fair, the entry decision links production and output
price to the distribution of the spot price as well as risk aversion. We proceed
in two steps. We ﬁrst show that the separation property holds at the second
stage of the game, i.e., for a given number of ﬁrms. We then show that,
once the number of ﬁrms is endogenized, the separation property no longer
23According to Freixas and Rochet (2008), banks diﬀer from other ﬁrms because they
have expertise for managing loans and deposits, for choosing their level of monitoring of
diﬀerent clients and for choosing their level of investment in speciﬁc relationships with
their clients. These speciﬁcities are forms of entry barriers in the banking industry. Banks
also have expertise in risk management of large portfolios of derivatives with market,
liquidity, and default risks. For an empirical analysis on scale economies in the provision
of underwriting services by banks and related entry barriers in the banking industry,
see Santos and Tsatsarinis (2003).
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holds because both uncertainty and risk aversion alter market concentration,
which, in turn, aﬀects both production and output price.
Proposition 3.2 provides the ﬁrm’s production and hedge coverage in the
Cournot equilibrium at the second stage of the game, i.e., for a given number
of ﬁrms. In equilibrium, the ﬁrms always produce regardless of the type of
ﬁnancial activity, i.e., q∗(J) > 0.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that there are J ≥ 1 ﬁrms in the industry at
the second stage of the game. Then, there exists a unique Cournot-Nash
equilibrium. In equilibrium, q∗(J) > 0 and ω∗(J) are deﬁned respectively by
P ′(Jq∗(J))q∗(J) + P(Jq∗(J))− F = 0 (8)
and
E
[
(F − S˜) · u′(Π∗ + (F − S˜)(1− ω∗(J))q∗(J))
]
= 0, (9)
Π∗ ≡ P(Jq∗(J))q∗(J)− Fq∗(J).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Using Proposition 3.2, Remark 3.3 states the separation property at the
second stage of the game. That is, the distribution of the spot price and risk
aversion have no eﬀect on production and output price. The futures price is
the sole driving force for production because, from (8), the marginal revenue
of output is equal to the futures price.24 The separation property is consistent
with the case of perfect competition either when there is uncertainty about
the output price (Ethier, 1973; Danthine, 1973; Holthausen, 1979; Feder et al.,
1980) or the input price (Holthausen, 1979; Katz and Paroush, 1979; Paroush
24Note that at stage 2 of the game, the separation property holds unconditionally be-
cause ﬁrms may either hedge or engage in speculation. Assuming CARA preferences, a
linear demand, and a normally distributed spot price, online Appendix 4 shows that if
ﬁrms can only hedge (i.e., have restricted access to the futures market), then produc-
tion and output price are only conditionally independent of uncertainty and risk aversion.
That is, conditional on hedging, production and output price remains independent of
uncertainty and risk aversion. However, the upper bound of the range of futures prices
yielding hedging is increasing in the mean and the variance of the spot price as well as
risk aversion.
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and Wolf, 1992) as long as there is no other source of uncertainty (e.g.,
uncertainty in production or basis risk).
Remark 3.3. From (8), at the second stage of the game, production and
output price are independent of uncertainty and risk aversion.
Having shown that separation occurs when there is no entry, we next
show that, when the ﬁrms make a decision on entry, the futures price is no
longer the driving force for the production decision. In fact, there is always
nonseparation because the distribution of the spot price and the utility func-
tion have an eﬀect on the production decision (and, thus, the output price)
through the number of ﬁrms entering the industry. We proceed as follows.
We ﬁrst characterize the number of ﬁrms entering the market at the ﬁrst
stage of the game (Proposition 3.4). We then provide a comparative analysis
of the eﬀect of changes in the distribution of the spot price for the input
as well as changes in risk aversion on the number of ﬁrms (Propositions 3.5
and 3.6). This comparative analysis establishes directly the nonseparation
result on production and output price (Proposition 3.7).
Proposition 3.4 states that there exists a unique free-entry equilibrium
with access to the futures market as long as the entry cost is not too high
to prevent at least one ﬁrm from entering the industry. The entry cost must
also be not too low to ensure a ﬁnite number of entering ﬁrms.
Proposition 3.4. Suppose that
lim
J→∞
Eu(P(Jq∗(J))q∗(J)− Fq∗(J) + (F − S˜)(1− ω∗(J))q∗(J)) < u(K)
≤ Eu(P(q∗(1))q∗(1)− Fq∗(1) + (F − S˜)(1− ω∗(1))q∗(1)). (10)
Then, there exists a unique equilibrium with 1 ≤ J∗ < ∞ ﬁrms in the industry
such that J∗ = 	N∗
 where N∗ is implicitly deﬁned by
Eu(P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)− Fq∗(N) + (F − S˜)(1− ω∗(N))q∗(N)) = u(K) (11)
evaluated at N = N∗.
Proof. See Appendix A.
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Propositions 3.5 and 3.6 state that, when the futures price is not actuar-
ially fair, market concentration depends on uncertainty and risk aversion.25
In particular, from Proposition 3.5, an increase in the mean of S˜ weakly
decreases (weakly increases) the number of ﬁrms when the futures market
is contango (normal backwardation). Indeed, when the market is contango
(normal backwardation), the ﬁrms are net buyers (net sellers) on the spot
market for the input. Hence, an increase in the mean of the spot price for the
input decreases (increases) the expected utility in the second stage, which
induces less (more) ﬁrms to enter the industry.
A riskier spot price weakly decreases the number of ﬁrms in the industry.26
From Proposition 3.6, an increase in risk aversion also weakly decreases the
number of ﬁrms in the industry. The similar result comes from the fact that
a mean-preserving increase in risk or an increase in risk aversion both reduce
the expected utility in the second stage, which induces less ﬁrms to enter the
industry.
We begin with the eﬀect of uncertainty on market concentration. To
that end, suppose that φ(S) = ψ(S;m, r) where an increase in m implies an
increase in the mean of S˜ whereas an increase in r implies a mean-preserving
increase in the risk of S˜ in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971).
Proposition 3.5. Suppose that φ(S) = ψ(S;m, r). Then, for F = ES˜,
1. An increase in the mean of S˜ weakly decreases (weakly increases) J∗
when F > ES˜ (F < ES˜).
2. A mean-preserving increase in the risk of S˜ weakly decreases J∗.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 3.6 states the eﬀect of increasing risk aversion on the number
of ﬁrms in the industry. Using the notation in Diamond and Stiglitz (1974),
suppose that u(π) = v(π; ρ) with v1 > 0, v11 < 0 and ∂ (−v11(π; ρ)/v1(π; ρ)) /∂ρ >
0. Hence, an increase in ρ implies an increase in risk aversion.
25If F = ES˜, then market concentration is independent of uncertainty and risk aversion.
26We adopt the expression weakly decrease or weakly increase because J∗ is an integer.
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Proposition 3.6. Suppose that u(π) = v(π; ρ) such that v1 > 0, v11 < 0
and ∂ (−v11(π; ρ)/v1(π; ρ)) /∂ρ > 0. Then, for F = ES˜, an increase in risk
aversion weakly decreases J∗.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Using Propositions 3.5 and 3.6, Proposition 3.7 states that as long as
the futures price is not actuarially fair, the separation property does not
hold when entry is considered. The negative eﬀect of mean (in a contango
situation), riskiness, or risk aversion on the number of ﬁrms implies that the
remaining ﬁrms can exercise more market power. Speciﬁcally, when there is
access to the futures market, higher riskiness induces each remaining ﬁrm to
produce more. However, while per-ﬁrm production increases along with more
riskiness, the number of ﬁrms decreases, which is the dominant eﬀect, and
the equilibrium output price unambiguously increases along with an increase
in the riskiness of the spot price. The result also holds for an increase in the
mean of the spot price in a contango situation or an increase in risk aversion.
Proposition 3.7. Suppose that the futures price is not actuarially fair, i.e.,
F = ES˜. Then, when entry is endogenized, production and output price
depend on uncertainty and risk aversion. In particular,
1. An increase in the mean of S˜ weakly increases (weakly decreases) q∗(J∗)
and p∗(J∗) when F > ES˜ (F < ES˜).
2. A mean-preserving increase in the risk of S˜ or an increase in risk aver-
sion weakly increases q∗(J∗) and p∗(J∗).
Proof. From (39) and (40), q∗(J∗) and p∗(J∗) = P(J∗q∗(J∗)) are both de-
creasing in J∗. Using Proposition 3.5 and 3.6 yields the results stated in
Proposition 3.7.
The result stated in Proposition 3.7 is in sharp contrast to the separation
result obtained in the literature in the absence of another source of uncer-
tainty (e.g., uncertainty in production or basis risk). In other words, once
ﬁrms are allowed to make entry decisions, the futures price is no longer the
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driving force for the production decision (even with one source of uncer-
tainty). Indeed, conditional on the number of ﬁrms, each ﬁrm is able to fully
adjust production in such a way that it is independent of uncertainty and
risk aversion. When ﬁrms also make entry decisions, production decisions
becomes less ﬂexible. Hence, the endogenization of the number of ﬁrms in
an industry with a cost of entry yields nonseparation.27
4 The Eﬀect of Access to Futures Market
In this section, we study the eﬀect of access to the futures market on entry.28
To simplify the discussion, we make the following restrictions. Managers’
risk preferences on proﬁt exhibit constant absolute risk aversion. Output
demand is linear and the ﬁrms’ beliefs about the spot price for the input are
normally distributed. These restrictions are consistent with Assumptions 2.1,
2.2, and 2.3 except for the fact that the support of the spot price is the real
line. Although the spot price can be negative, the values of the parameters
of the model can be restricted to ensure that the probability of such events
be arbitrarily close to zero. Moreover, it turns out that, by assuming a
positive mean of the spot price, equilibrium values for the number of ﬁrms,
the production, and the output price are always positive.
Formally, our restrictions are as follows. The coeﬃcient of absolute risk
aversion is α > 0.29 Inverse demand is linear, i.e.,
P
(∑J
k=1
qk
)
= θ − γ
∑J
k=1
qk, (12)
where θ, γ > 0 are demand parameters. The spot price for the input is
normally distributed, i.e., S˜ ∼ N(μS, σ2S), μS ∈ (0, θ). Given our restrictions,
the certainty equivalent has a closed-form solution. Using (2), the certainty
27If entry were not costly, the number of ﬁrms would be inﬁnity in our case. In the
limit, total production and output price would be independent of the distribution of the
spot price and risk aversion.
28The eﬀect of access to the futures market on production and output price is discussed
in online Appendix 7.
29In other words, the utility function for proﬁt π is exponential: u(π) = −e−απ.
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equivalent of ﬁrm j is
CE
(
J, qj, ωj,
∑J
k =j
qk
)
= P
(
qj +
∑J
k =j
qk
)
qj − μS(1− ωj)qj
− Fωjqj − ασ2S(1− ωj)2q2j /2 (13)
as shown in online Appendix 2.
Since J∗ = 	N∗
 is an integer, we use the continuous variable N∗ when-
ever we need to approximate the eﬀect of any parameter on J∗ by computing
the partial derivative of N∗ with respect to that parameter. In addition,
we use N∗ instead of J∗ to approximate the remaining equilibrium variables,
e.g., q∗(J∗) ≈ q∗(N∗). This approximation has no bearing on the results since
the number of ﬁrms is not bounded between two integers. Hence, changes in
N∗ are informative about changes in J∗.30
We ﬁrst characterize the equilibrium with and without access to the fu-
tures market. We then compare the equilibrium values under access and
under no access to the futures market on entry. The eﬀect of ﬁnancial access
on production and output price is found in online Appendix 7.
4.1 Equilibrium Characterization
Access to Financial Market. Proposition 4.1 states the unique free-entry
equilibrium with access to the futures market.
Proposition 4.1. For F ∈ (0, θ), there exists a unique equilibrium with
1 ≤ J∗ < ∞ ﬁrms in the industry if and only if
(F − μS)2
2ασ2S
< K ≤ (θ − F )
2
4γ
+
(F − μS)2
2ασ2S
. (14)
In equilibrium, J∗ = 	N∗
 ﬁrms enter the industry where
N∗ =
θ − F√(
K − (F−μS)2
2ασ2S
)
γ
− 1. (15)
30Moreover, since the equilibrium is symmetric, the summation operator is not present
in the equilibrium values.
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Each ﬁrm produces
q∗(J∗) ≈ q∗(N∗) =
√(
K − (F − μS)
2
2ασ2S
)
/γ (16)
at output price
p∗(J∗) ≈ p∗(N∗) =
√(
K − (F − μS)
2
2ασ2S
)
γ + F. (17)
Hedge coverage is
ω∗(J∗) ≈ ω∗(N∗) = 1−
√
γ(F − μS)
ασ2S
√
K − (F−μS)2
2ασ2S
. (18)
Proof. See online Appendix 3.
We now discuss several properties of the equilibrium. From condition (14)
in Proposition 4.1, there exists an equilibrium with access to the futures
market as long as the entry cost is not too high to prevent at least one ﬁrm
from entering the industry. The entry cost must also be not too low to ensure
a ﬁnite number of entering ﬁrms.
Condition (14) is depicted in Figure 2, where F ∈ (0, θ) is on the x-axis,
and K > 0 is on the y−axis.31 The two convex lines depict the lower and
upper bounds in (14).32 Hence, the darker shaded area between the two
curves encompasses the points {K,F} for which the equilibrium exists, and,
in particular, a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms enter the industry. Note that entry may
occur for all values of F , whether the futures market is normal backwardation
(F ∈ (0, μS)), actuarially fair (F = μS), or contango (F > μS). Note as well
that, while the upper and lower bounds of (14) depends on the mean and
variance of the spot price (and risk aversion), the darker shaded area between
31To generate Figure 2, we set {θ, γ} = {7, 1}, and {μS , σ2S , α} = {2, 1, 1}. Although
Figure 2 is generated with speciﬁc values, the shapes of the curves hold in general. The
same comment applies to all ﬁgures.
32Note that the lower and upper bounds do not require to be approximated. Hence, we
use the variable J∗ in Figure 2.
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the two curves,∫ θ
0
(
(θ − x)2
4γ
+
(x− μS)2
2ασ2S
− (x− μS)
2
2ασ2S
)
dx =
θ3
12γ
(19)
is unaﬀected by changes in the mean and variance of the spot price as well
as risk aversion. In other words an increase in any of these three parameters
does not reduce the possibility of entry. Below the lowest convex curve, there
is no equilibrium with a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms. In other words, all potential
entrants have an incentive to enter. Because unlimited entry (with K > 0) is
solely due to speculative motives, we delay our discussion about the limiting
case (i.e., J∗ → ∞).
Having discussed the condition for entry, we provide information about
the types of ﬁnancial activities in which the ﬁrms engage in equilibrium.
Proposition 4.2 states that, whenever the equilibrium exists, the ﬁrms may
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hedge or speculate (or both) depending on the structure of the futures market
and the value of the entry cost.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose that (14) holds. Then, in equilibrium,
1. For F ∈ (0, μS), the ﬁrms fully hedge production and, at the same time,
speculate by buying in the futures market to sell in the spot market, i.e.,
ω∗(N∗) > 1.
2. For F = μS, the ﬁrms fully hedge production, i.e., ω
∗(N∗) = 1.
3. For F ∈ (μS, θ), there are three exclusive outcomes.
(a) The ﬁrms partially hedge, i.e., ω∗(N∗) ∈ (0, 1).
(b) The ﬁrms do not access the futures markets, i.e., ω∗(N∗) = 0.
(c) The ﬁrms speculate by buying in the spot market to sell in the
futures market, i.e., ω∗(N∗) < 0.
Proof. See online Appendix 3.
Figure 3 illustrates Proposition 4.2 by providing information about the
ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial activity when there is a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms entering the
industry.33 Note that Figure 3 uses the value of ω∗(N∗) (as provided by (18))
to approximate ω∗(J∗). If the futures market is in normal backwardation
(i.e., F < μS), then the ﬁrms fully hedge and speculate. That is, the input is
purchased only on the futures market, some of which is used for production
and the remaining is sold on the spot market. Whenever the futures price is
actuarially fair (i.e., F = μS), the ﬁrms fully hedge. See the dashed vertical
line in Figure 3 for which ω∗(N∗) = 1.
A contango futures market (i.e., F > μS) yields either partial hedging or
speculation (with no hedging) depending on the value of the entry cost and
the futures price. The division between these two outcomes is depicted by
the dashed increasing convex line K =
(2γ+ασ2S )(F−μS)2
2α2σ4S
, intersecting with the
33Figures 2 and 3 are generated using the same parameter values.
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minimum of the upper bound for K in (14), i.e., when F = F 1 ≡ 2γμS+ασ
2
Sθ
2γ+ασ2S
.34
From Figure 3, in a contango situation, hedging is possible only for lower
values of the futures price, while speculation (buying from the spot market
to sell on the futures market) can occur at any futures price as long as the
entry cost is low enough.
Remark 4.3. For F ∈ [F 1, θ), hedging is no longer chosen regardless of the
value of the entry cost
The entry cost inﬂuences the type of ﬁnancial activity. In Figure 3, con-
sider a point {K,F} in the area for partial hedging (i.e., ω∗(N∗) ∈ (0, 1)). A
decrease in the entry cost while keeping the futures price constant eventually
leads to a switch from hedging to speculation. This is due to the fact that a
34The points {K,F} on the dashed increasing line that intersects the upper bound
of (14) at its minimum refer to cases for which the ﬁrms do not access the futures market,
i.e., ω∗(N∗) = 0.
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lower K yields more entry, which reduces proﬁt from selling the output, and,
thus, raises the opportunity cost of hedging (instead of speculating) under
contango.
Remark 4.4. For F ∈ (μS, F 1], a lower entry cost can induce the ﬁrms not
to hedge, but to engage in speculation instead.
Finally, hedging becomes more likely under contango along with an in-
crease in the variance of the spot price or risk aversion. This is illustrated
in Figure 4, which shows that an increase in the variance of the spot price
moves F 1 ≡ 2γμS+ασ
2
Sθ
2γ+ασ2S
to the right, which increases the darker shaded area
(partial hedging) and reduces the lighter shaded area (speculation).35
Remark 4.5. For F ∈ [μS, θ), an increase (decrease) in σ2S or α makes it
more likely for hedging (speculation) to occur.
35To generate Figure 4, we set {θ, γ} = {10, 1} and{μS, α} = {5, 1}.
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It remains to discuss the limiting case below the lowest convex curve in
Figure 2. Speciﬁcally, the lighter shaded area in Figure 2 combines the points
{K,F} for which entry is always beneﬁcial regardless of the number of ﬁrms
active in the market. In other words, the stage-2 certainty equivalent is high
enough to cover the entry cost for any number of ﬁrms, which yields the
case of perfect competition. Due to unlimited entry, the proﬁt from the out-
put sector approaches zero (i.e., the perfect competition outcome drives the
output price to the marginal cost), while the ﬁrms engage in speculation to
generate revenue from the ﬁnancial sector. Consistent with Figure 2, this is
only possible when the futures price is not actuarially fair. From Figure 2,
there are two outcomes under the limiting case of perfect competition (i.e.,
in the lighter shaded area). The ﬁrms speculate by selling futures contracts
under contango (i.e., F > μS), while buying them under normal backwar-
dation (i.e., F < μS). Although K > 0, speculation on the futures market
makes it possible for the output market to approach perfect competition in
the limit.
Proposition 4.6. For F ∈ (0, θ), F = μS, and 0 < K ≤ (F−μS)22ασ2 , J∗ → ∞
yielding the perfectly competitive outcome in the output sector. Further, ﬁrms
always engage in speculation in the futures market.
Proof. Suppose that F ∈ (0, θ), F = μS and 0 < K ≤ (F−μS)22ασ2 . From (17) in
online Appendix 3, CE∗(J) = (θ−F )
2
(1+J)2γ
+ (F−μS)
2
2ασ2S
> K for any J . Hence, J∗ →
∞. From (12) and (13) in online Appendix 3, limJ∗→∞ x∗(J∗) = F−μSασ2S and
limJ∗→∞ y∗(J∗) = −F−μSασ2S , while, from (14) and (16) in online Appendix 3,
limJ∗→∞ q∗(J∗) = 0, and limJ∗→∞ p∗(J∗) = F .36
No Access to Financial Market. Next, we turn to the characterization
and discussion of the benchmark equilibrium when the ﬁrms have no access
to the futures market. Proposition 4.7 characterizes the unique equilibrium.
To clarify the analysis, the hat sign is used on equilibrium values when there
is no access to the futures market.
36Recall that q∗(J∗) = x∗(J∗) + y∗(J∗) where x∗(J∗) is the amount of input purchased
(or sold) in the spot market and y∗(J∗) is the amount of input purchased (or sold) in the
futures market.
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Proposition 4.7. Suppose that no ﬁrm has access to the futures market, i.e.,
the constraint ωj = 0 holds for all j. Then, there exists a unique equilibrium
with 1 ≤ Jˆ∗ < ∞ if and only if
0 < K ≤ Kˆ ≡ (θ − μS)
2
2(2γ + ασ2S)
. (20)
In equilibrium, Jˆ∗ = 	N∗
 ﬁrms enter the industry where
Nˆ∗ =
(θ − μS)
√
2γ + ασ2S
γ
√
2K
− ασ
2
S
γ
− 1. (21)
Each ﬁrm produces
qˆ∗(Jˆ∗) ≈ qˆ∗(Nˆ∗) =
√
2K√
2γ + ασ2S
(22)
at output price
pˆ∗(Jˆ∗) ≈ pˆ∗(Nˆ∗) = μS +
√
2K(γ + ασ2S)√
2γ + ασ2S
. (23)
Proof. See online Appendix 3.
Two comments about Proposition 4.7 are warranted. First, there exists
an equilibrium as long as the entry cost is not too high to prevent at least
one ﬁrm from entering the industry.37 Condition (20) is depicted in Figure 5,
where F ∈ (0, θ) is on the x-axis, and K > 0 is on the y−axis. Given that
the ﬁrms do not access the futures market, the condition is independent of
F and the ﬁrms enter as long as K ≤ Kˆ ≡ (θ−μS )2
2(2γ+ασ2S )
.38
Second, access to the futures market alters the comparative analysis
on the eﬀect of uncertainty and risk preferences stated in Propositions 3.5
37An equilibrium with a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms exists as long as the entry cost is strictly
greater than zero, otherwise an inﬁnite number of potential ﬁrms would enter the industry.
38Unlike the case of access to the futures market, an increase in the mean or variance of
the spot price, or an increase in risk aversion under no access to the futures market reduces
the possibility of entry. Indeed, from (20), ∂Kˆ/∂μS < 0, ∂Kˆ/∂σ
2
S < 0, ∂Kˆ/∂α < 0.
See (19) for the case of access to the futures market.
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and 3.6. Indeed, recall from Propositions 3.5 and 3.6 that a riskier spot price
or an increase in risk aversion yields more production under access to the
futures market. However, without ﬁnancial access, an increase in risk or risk
aversion induces the ﬁrms to produce less. That is, using (22), ∂qˆ
∗(Nˆ∗)
∂σ2S
< 0,
∂qˆ∗(Nˆ∗)
∂α
< 0.39 In other words, ﬁnancial access reverses the eﬀect of riskiness
and risk aversion on per-ﬁrm production.
4.2 Entry
Using Section 4.1, we can now study the eﬀect of access to the futures market
on entry. Before proceeding with the analysis, it is useful to recall how the
39The result without ﬁnancial access is consistent with classical results obtained in a
static environment (i.e., without entry decision) for perfect competition (Sandmo, 1971;
Batra and Ullah, 1974) and quantity-setting monopoly (Leland, 1972).
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number of ﬁrms is determined in equilibrium. Given an entry cost K > 0,
the variables N∗ (the number of ﬁrms with access to the futures market) and
Nˆ∗ (i.e., the number of ﬁrms without access) are uniquely deﬁned by
CE∗(N∗) = K (24)
and
ĈE
∗
(Nˆ∗) = K, (25)
respectively. Here, from (17) and (26) in online appendix 3, for any N ,40
CE∗(N) =
(θ − F )2
(1 +N)2γ
+
(F − μS)2
2ασ2S
, (26)
ĈE
∗
(N) =
(2γ + ασ2S)(θ − μS)2
2((1 + J)γ + ασ2S)
2
. (27)
We provide two results about entry. First, access to the futures market
allows the industry to bear a higher entry cost. Second, access to the futures
markets can increase or decrease the number of ﬁrms entering the industry.
These two seemingly contradictory results are in fact consistent with (24)
and (25) and the behavior of the stage-2 certainty equivalent as a function
of the number of ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, from (26) and (27), it is not always true
that CE∗(N) > ĈE
∗
(N) for all N . While CE∗(N) and ĈE
∗
(N) are both
decreasing in N and CE∗(1) > ĈE
∗
(1), it is possible for CE∗(N) to decrease
more rapidly than ĈE
∗
(N) and thus cross ĈE
∗
(N) from above. Hence, for
low values of the entry cost, a greater number of ﬁrms enter the industry
when there is no access to the futures market. We now present our two
results in detail.
Combining the information of Figures 2 and 5 into Figure 6 shows that
(anticipated) access to the futures market can facilitate entry. In particular,
for futures prices F ∈ (μS, F 1], F 1 ≡ 2γμS+ασ
2
Sθ
2γ+ασ2S
, partial hedging (without
speculation) allows ﬁrms to enter for an entry cost above Kˆ, which would have
been otherwise impossible without access to the futures market. See area A
40Notation has been simpliﬁed to CE∗(N) ≡ CE(N, q∗(N), ω∗(N), (N − 1)q∗(N)) and
ĈE
∗
(N) ≡ ĈE(N, qˆ∗(N), ωˆ∗(N), (N − 1)qˆ∗(N)).
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in Figure 6 such that F ∈ (μS, F 1). Moreover, for futures prices F ∈ (0, μS)
or F ∈ (F 1, θ), speculation induces ﬁrms to enter for an entry cost above
Kˆ. See area A such that F ∈ (0, μS) and area B in Figure 6. As noted,
Proposition 4.8 does not imply that access to the futures market always
increases the stage-2 certainty equivalent. That is, from (26) and (27), it is
not true that CE∗(N) > ĈE
∗
(N) for all N . While one ﬁrm always beneﬁts
from access to the futures market (i.e., CE∗(1) > ĈE
∗
(1)), the presence of
several ﬁrms interacting strategically may change the ordering. The reason
is that access to the futures market reduces the cost of bearing risk and
intensiﬁes the Cournot game, which decreases stage-2 certainty equivalent.
In some cases, the beneﬁt from reducing risk through hedging is outweighed
by the loss due to more intensive Cournot competition. This important point
is discussed again when we explain the ambiguous eﬀect of the futures price
on the number of ﬁrms at the end of this section and in online Appendix 6.
Proposition 4.8. Access to the futures market allows ﬁrms to bear a higher
entry cost, i.e., entry of at least one ﬁrm is possible for K > Kˆ. In partic-
ular, access to the futures market under partial hedging can generate higher
expected proﬁts, which compensates for a higher ﬁxed cost of entry.41
While the industry can bear a higher entry cost, the eﬀect of access to
the futures market on the number of ﬁrms is ambiguous. To see this, we
begin by comparing the number of ﬁrms under an actuarially fair futures
price with the number of ﬁrms when there is no access to the futures market.
Proposition 4.9 states that the number of ﬁrms is greater with an actuarially
fair futures price as long as the entry cost is high enough.
Proposition 4.9. Suppose that 0 < K < Kˆ ≡ (θ−μS)2
2(2γ+ασS )
. Then, N∗|F=μS >
Nˆ∗ if and only if
(θ − μS)2
2(
√
2γ + ασ2S +
√
2γ)2
< K ≤ (θ − μS)
2
2(2γ + ασ2S)
. (28)
Proof. From (15) and (21), N∗|F=μS > Nˆ∗ if and only ifK >
(
√
2γ+ασ2S−
√
2γ)2(θ−μS)2
2α2σ4S
,
41This situation arises in area A in Figure 6 such that F ∈ (μS , F 1).
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Figure 6: Entry, Access vs. No Access to the Futures Market
which is the same as the lower bound in (28). The inequality (θ−μS)
2
2
(√
2γ+ασ2S+
√
2γ
)2 <
(θ−μS)2
2(2γ+ασS )
holds always.
To understand why access to the futures market may lead to a lower
number of ﬁrms, we need to show how the ordering of (15) and (21) depends
on the value of the futures price. To that end, we ﬁrst illustrate the pattern
graphically. We then study in details the eﬀect of F on N∗ and show that
due to the convex shape of N∗ as a function of F , N∗ can be either below or
above Nˆ∗.
Consider Figure 7, where F ∈ [μS, θ) is on the x-axis, while N∗ > 0 is
on the y-axis. The convex solid line plots N∗ as a function of F , which is
the general shape of (15). The straight dash-dot line is the number of ﬁrms
under no access to the futures market. From (21), Nˆ∗ is independent of F .
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Figure 7: Number of Firms
When the convex curve intersects the straight line from below at F = F ′′
in Figure 7a, the ﬁrms switch from partial hedging to speculation, i.e., from
ω∗(N∗) ∈ (0, 1) to ω∗(N∗) < 0.42
Consider ﬁrst the case in which N∗|F=μS > Nˆ∗ as depicted in Fig-
ure 7a. Here, the entry cost is high in the sense that K ∈ (K, Kˆ], K ≡
(θ−μS)2
2(
√
2γ+ασ2S+
√
2γ)2
, as in (28). Note that, as long as the futures price is close
enough to μS, hedging yields more ﬁrms in the industry. Consider next the
case in which N∗|F=μS < Nˆ∗ as depicted in Figure 7b. Here, the entry cost
is low, i.e., K ∈ (0, K). Regardless of the futures price, hedging always
yields fewer ﬁrms in the industry. While access to the futures market may
increase or decrease the number of ﬁrms when partial hedging occurs,43 it is
clear from Figures 7a and 7b that speculation in a contango situation always
yields more ﬁrms.44
Having shown graphically that the ordering of N∗ and Nˆ∗ depends on F ,
we now provide the derivative of N∗ with respect to F in Proposition 4.10.
Consistent with Figure 7, N∗ ﬁrst decreases, then increases. We then explain
42Hence, F ′′ is the largest value of the futures price such that N∗ = Nˆ∗ and ∂N∗/∂F >
0. From (18), ω∗(N∗)|F=F ′′ = 0.
43Recall that ω∗(N∗) ∈ (0, 1) when F ∈ (μS , F ′′).
44Recall that ω∗(N∗) < 0 when F ∈ (F ′′, θ).
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why an increase in F can lead to a higher number of ﬁrms in the industry
even when the ﬁrms partially hedge (for F ∈ (μS, F ′′)).
Proposition 4.10. Suppose that ﬁrms have access to the futures market.
Then,
1. For F ∈ (0, μS), ∂N∗∂F < 0.
2. For F ∈ [μS, θ), ∂N∗∂F > 0 if and only if F > μS +
2ασ2S
θ−μS .
Proof. Diﬀerentiating (15) yields
∂N∗
∂F
=
−
√(
K − (F−μS)2
2ασ2S
)
γ + (F−μS)
2ασ2S
(θ − F )
(
K − (F−μS)2
2ασ2S
)− 1
2 √
γ(
K − (F−μS)2
2ασ2S
)
γ
, (29)
which yields the cases stated in Proposition 4.10.
Before proceeding with a detailed explanation of this result, note that
the positive relationship between the futures price and the number of ﬁrms
entering the industry may occur not only when ﬁrms speculate, but also
when ﬁrms partially hedge in a contango futures market. See conditions (20)
and (22) in online Appendix 3.45 Note also that an increase in F does
not yield the same eﬀect as a decrease in μS. The reason is that, due to
the separation result at stage 2 of the game, a change in μS alters stage-
2 certainty equivalent directly. However, a change in F has both a direct
eﬀect and an indirect eﬀect (through policy functions) on stage-2 certainty
equivalent.
45To obtain ∂N
∗
∂F > 0 when the ﬁrms hedge, the following must hold
(F − μS)(θ − μS)
2ασ2S
>
(2γ + ασ2S)(F − μS)2
2α2σ4S
. (30)
Rearranging (30) yields
F <
2γμS + ασ
2
Sθ
2γ + ασ2S
≡ F 1, (31)
which, from Remark 4.3, is a necessary condition on the value of the futures price for
hedging to occur. See also Figure 3.
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We now provide an explanation for the positive relationship between the
futures price and the number of ﬁrms entering the industry. Due to strategic
interactions, an increase in F might increase stage-2 certainty equivalent for
a given N , which enables more ﬁrms to cover the entry cost, and, thus, enter
the industry. To show this, we study the eﬀect of F on the stage-2 certainty
equivalent for a given number of ﬁrms in the industry. Indeed, if F increases
CE∗(N), then N∗ implicitly deﬁned by CE∗(N∗) = K increases as well.
Using (26), CE∗(N) is strictly increasing in F if and only if
(1 +N)2γμS + 2ασ
2
Sθ
(1 +N)2γ + 2ασ2S
< F < θ. (32)
Hence, the ﬁrms might not necessarily beneﬁt from a lower futures price due
to a more competitive futures market.46 In other words, stage-2 certainty
equivalent is not necessarily decreasing in the futures price. In fact, CE∗(N)
is convex in F , so that a lower futures price may lead to a lower stage-
2 certainty equivalent. This eﬀect occurs sometimes when ﬁrms partially
hedge, and always when ﬁrms speculate. Further, it can only occur in a
contango situation. In other words, CE∗(N) is decreasing in F under normal
backwardation and actuarially fair pricing.
The positive relationship between stage-2 certainty equivalent and F
when the ﬁrms partially hedge is due to the fact that an increase in the cost
of hedging induces ﬁrms to decrease output, which can mitigate the eﬀect of
increasing output due to the strategic interaction of the ﬁrms.47 Speciﬁcally,
the eﬀect of an increase in the futures price on the stage-2 certainty equiv-
alent is two-fold. First, an increase in F directly decreases stage-2 certainty
equivalent. Second, there is an indirect eﬀect through the behavior of the
ﬁrms, i.e., an increase in F induces ﬁrms to decrease production. This, in
turn, mitigates the externality that the ﬁrms have on one another, which
may increase stage-2 certainty equivalent. Both eﬀects pull in opposite di-
rections and the overall eﬀect is ambiguous. See online Appendix 6 for a
46A more competitive futures market might arise in the presence of risk-neutral specu-
lators.
47The ﬁrms partially hedge when F is such that
(1+N)2γμS+2ασ
2
Sθ
(1+N)2γ+2ασ2S
< F <
(1+N)γμS+ασ
2
Sθ
(1+N)γ+ασ2S
.
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Figure 8: The Eﬀect of F on CE∗(N)
formal exposition.
Figure 8 depicts the eﬀect of the futures price on the stage-2 certainty
equivalent resulting from the strategic interaction of the ﬁrms in a non-
cooperative game. Speciﬁcally, Figures 8a and 8b depict the stage-2 cer-
tainty equivalent of a ﬁrm with contango for an industry with N = 3 ﬁrms
and N = 4 ﬁrms, respectively.48 For low futures prices, the ﬁrm hedges. For
prices greater than FN ≡ (1+N)γμS+ασ
2
Sθ
(1+N)γ+ασ2S
, the ﬁrm produces without hedging
the random cost, but speculates.
For the case in which there is no speculation in equilibrium (i.e., F ∈
[μS, FN ]), we make an additional comment. In Figure 8a, with N = 3, each
ﬁrm attains his highest stage-2 certainty equivalent when the price of hedge
coverage is actuarially fair, F = μS. Here, hedging results in higher stage-2
certainty equivalent as long as μS ≤ F ≤ F ′. However, in Figure 8b, with
N = 4, CE∗|F=μS is not the highest value. The ambiguous eﬀect of the cost
of hedging on stage-2 certainty equivalent implies that a more competitive
futures market due in part to risk-neutral speculators might be detrimental
to the ﬁrms.
48The values of the remaining parameters of the model are θ = 10, γ = μS = σ
2
S = α = 1.
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5 Final Remarks
This paper provides an analysis of the ﬁrms’ production and hedging de-
cisions under imperfect competition with potential entry. Entry is shown
to remove the separation result, i.e., although the ﬁrms have access to the
futures market, their production decisions depend on uncertainty and risk
aversion through the determination of the number of ﬁrms in the industry.
We also show that the use of futures contracts have an ambiguous eﬀect on
the market structure of the industry. For instance, access to the futures mar-
ket may increase or decrease the number of entering ﬁrms. For the eﬀect of
access to futures market, it is worth exploring in future whether our results
hold in general.
To study the interaction between entry and the futures market, we have
abstracted from three important aspects. First, we have assumed that the
spot and futures prices were exogenous. However, these prices are determined
by markets as well, which, in turn, aﬀects resources allocation, production
decisions, and risk-taking. Extending the model to include suppliers of the
input along with speculators is an avenue for future research. While the de-
termination of spot and futures prices has already been studied by Turnovsky
(1983), the output producers are assumed to be passive, i.e., their demand for
the input is given. In fact, output producers are active and forward-looking
and, as shown in this paper, their output and input decisions are entwined.
Second, we have ignored the role of ﬁnancial decisions in deterring entry. It
would also be interesting to study how strategic hedging from an incumbent
ﬁrm may alter the decision entry of a potential entrant. For instance, Maskin
(1999) considers a model in which capacity installation by an incumbent ﬁrm
serves to deter others from entering the industry. Uncertainty about demand
or costs forces the incumbent to choose a higher capacity level than it would
under certainty. This higher requirement for capacity diminishes the at-
tractiveness of deterrence. It would be interesting to study the incumbent’s
incentive to deter entry when it has access to futures markets.
Finally, an empirical extension would be to test the model in the airline
industry or any industry with similar characteristics facing Cournot competi-
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tion. Recent empirical tests on hedging were limited to the eﬀect of diﬀerent
determinants such as CEO risk aversion, convexity of tax function, corporate
governance, distress costs, information asymmetry, and the eﬀect of hedging
on ﬁrm value. To our knowledge, no study has analyzed the eﬀect of hedging
on entry. The main empirical question would be: Do airline companies that
hedge (or speculate) enter diﬀerent routes more aggressively? Our theoreti-
cal results are ambiguous on this question and an empirical prediction from
the model is that airline companies produces less in diﬀerent routes when
futures prices are high, which induces more ﬁrms to enter and hedge their
fuel cost.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Letting xj ≡ (1− ωj)qj be the units of output
for which ﬁrm j does not hedge and using (2), (5) is rewritten as
max
qj ,xj
P(0)∫
0
u(P(qj +Q
∗
−j)qj − Fqj + (F − S)xj) · φ(S)dS (33)
where Q∗−j ≡ (J − 1)q∗(J) is the total output of the other ﬁrms. Since the
Hessian matrix is negative deﬁnite,49 ﬁrm j’s best-response is deﬁned by the
ﬁrst-order conditions
qj :
P(0)∫
0
(P ′(qj +Q∗−j)qj + P(qj +Q
∗
−j)− F )
× u′(P(qj +Q∗−j)qj − Fqj + (F − S)xj) · φ(S)dS = 0 (34)
and
xj :
P(0)∫
0
(F − S) · u′(P(qj +Q∗−j)qj − Fqj + (F − S)xj) · φ(S)dS = 0. (35)
First, consider expression (34). Since u′ > 0, it follows that
P(0)∫
0
u′(P(qj +Q∗−j)qj − Fqj + (F − S)xj) · φ(S)dS > 0. (36)
Hence, (34) holds if and only if
P ′(qj +Q∗−j)qj + P(qj +Q
∗
−j)− F = 0 (37)
since (37) is not a function of S. From Assumption 2.2, ﬁrm j’s best-response
function to the output of the other ﬁrms has a nonpositive slope larger than
49See online Appendix 1.
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−1, i.e., from (37), ∂qj/∂Q∗−j ∈ (−1, 0). Hence, q∗(J) is uniquely deﬁned
by (37) evaluated at qj = q
∗(J), which yields (8). Second, consider expres-
sion (35). Since u′′ < 0 and given that q∗(J) exists and is unique, x∗(J) exists
and is unique. Since x∗(J) = (1 − ω∗(J))q∗(J), it follows that ω∗(J) exists
and is uniquely deﬁned by (9).
Proof of Proposition 3.4. We need to show that the left-hand side
of (11) is strictly decreasing in N .
1. The term P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N) − Fq∗(N) in the left-hand side of (11) is
strictly decreasing in N , i.e.,
∂ (P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)− Fq∗(N))
∂N
< 0 (38)
since, from (8), ∂q∗(N)/∂N < 0 and ∂ (Nq∗(N)) /∂N > 0.50
2. Plugging x∗(N) ≡ (1 − ω∗(N))q∗(N) into the left-hand side of (11)
and applying the envelope theorem, the derivative of the left-hand side
50Given Conditions 2 and 3 of Assumption 2.2 and q∗(N) > 0, diﬀerentiating (8) yields
∂q∗(N)
∂N
= − P
′′(Nq∗(N))q∗(N) + P ′(Nq∗(N))
P ′′(Nq∗(N))Nq∗(N) + (N + 1)P ′(Nq∗(N))
q∗(N) < 0. (39)
Hence,
∂ (Nq∗(N))
∂N
=
P ′(Nq∗(N))
P ′′(Nq∗(N))Jq∗(N) + (N + 1)P ′(Nq∗(N))
q∗(N) > 0. (40)
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of (11) with respect to N is
∂
P(0)∫
0
u(P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)− Fq∗(N) + (F − S)x∗(N)) · φ(S)dS
∂N
=
∂x∗(N)
∂N
P(0)∫
0
(F − S) · u′(P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)− Fq∗(N) + (F − S)x∗(N)) · φ(S)dS
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 from (9)
+
P(0)∫
0
∂ (P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)− Fq∗(N))
∂N
× u′(P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)− Fq∗(N) + (F − S)x∗(N)) · φ(S)dS. (41)
Using (38) and the fact that u′ > 0 implies that (41) is strictly negative.
Since (10) holds, and given (41), it follows that the left-hand side of (11)
crosses the u(K)-line from above only once. Hence, N∗ (as deﬁned by (11))
is unique and so is J∗ = 	N∗
.
Proof of Proposition 3.5. Since J∗ = 	N∗
, we use (11) to derive the
eﬀect of an increase in m and r on J∗. The proof has two steps. First, we
establish the sign of x∗(N). Second, we show the eﬀects of an increase in m
and an increase in r on the left-hand side of (11), which depends on the sign
of x∗(N).
1. We ﬁrst sign x∗(N) ≡ (1 − ω∗(N))q∗(N). Plugging x∗(N) ≡ (1 −
ω∗(N))q∗(N) into expression (9) (evaluated at J = N) yields
cov[(F−S˜), u′(Π∗+(F−S˜)x∗(N))]+(F−ES˜)·Eu′(Π∗+(F−S˜)x∗(N)) = 0,
(42)
where E and cov are, respectively, the expectation operator and the
covariance operator. Here, Π∗ ≡ P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N) − Fq∗(N), and
Eu′(Π∗ + (F − S˜)x∗(N)) > 0.
(a) Suppose ﬁrst that F = ES˜. Then, from (42), it must be that
x∗(N) = 0 so that cov[(F − S˜), u′(Π∗ + (F − S˜)x∗(N))] = 0.
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(b) Suppose next that F > ES˜. Then, from (42), it must be that
x∗(N) > 0 so that cov[(F − S˜), u′(Π∗ + (F − S˜)x∗(N))] < 0.
(c) Suppose that F < ES˜. Then, from (42), it must be that x∗(N) < 0
so that cov[(F − S˜), u′(Π∗ + (F − S˜)x∗(N))] > 0.
2. Next, plugging x∗(N) ≡ (1 − ω∗(N))q∗(N) and φ(S) = ψ(S;m, r)
into (11) yields
P(0)∫
0
u(P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)−Fq∗(N)+(F−S)x∗(N))·ψ(S;m, r)dS = u(K)
(43)
evaluated at N = N∗. Using the sign of x∗(N), the proof consists in
showing that an increase in m or an increase in r changes the left-hand
side of (43) thereby changing N∗, which in turn changes J∗ = 	N∗
.
To that end, let
Γ ≡
P(0)∫
0
u(P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)− Fq∗(N) + (F − S)x∗(N)) · ψ(S;m, r)dS
(44)
be the left-hand side of (43).
40
(a) Consider ﬁrst an increase in m. From (44),51
∂Γ
∂m
=
∂q∗(N)
∂m
(P ′(Nq∗(N))Nq∗(N) + P(Nq∗(N))− F )
×
P(0)∫
0
u′(P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)− Fq∗(N) + (F − S)x∗(N)) · ψ(S;m, r)dS
+
∂x∗(N)
∂m
×
P(0)∫
0
(F − S)u′(P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)− Fq∗(N) + (F − S)x∗(N)) · ψ(S;m, r)dS
−
P(0)∫
0
u(P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)− Fq∗(N) + (F − S)x∗(N)) · ∂ψ(S;m, r)
∂m
dS
(45)
where ∂q
∗(N)
∂m
= 0 due to the separation property stated in Re-
mark 3.3, and, from (9),
P(0)∫
0
(F−S)·u′(P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)−Fq∗(N)+(F−S)x∗(N))·ψ(S;m, r)dS = 0.
(46)
Hence, (45) simpliﬁes to
∂Γ
∂m
=
P(0)∫
0
u(P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)−Fq∗(N)+(F−S)x∗(N))·∂ψ(S;m, r)
∂m
dS.
(47)
The sign of (47) is for the moment ambiguous because ∂ψ(S;m,r)
∂m
may be positive or negative depending on the value for S. Inte-
51Here, the notation ∂ψ(S;m,r)∂m refers to the diﬀerence between two p.d.f.’s, i.e., for
m1 > m2, ψ(S;m1, r) − ψ(S;m2, r) as used in Laﬀont (1989).
41
grating by parts (47) yields
∂Γ
∂m
= u(P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)− Fq∗(N) + (F − S)x∗(N))∂Ψ(S;m, r)
∂m
∣∣∣∣P(0)
0
+ x∗(N)
P(0)∫
0
u′(P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)− Fq∗(N) + (F − S)x∗(N))∂Ψ(S;m, r)
∂m
dS
(48)
where Ψ(S;m, r) is the c.d.f of S˜ and ∂Ψ(S;m,r)
∂m
refers to the diﬀer-
ence between two c.d.f.’s. Since Ψ(0;m, r) = 0 and Ψ(P(0);m, r) =
1 for all m, the ﬁrst term in (48) is equal to zero. Moreover, using
the deﬁnition of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance and the fact that
an increase in m induces an increase in the mean of S˜, it follows
that ∂Ψ(S;m,r)
∂m
< 0.
i. Suppose ﬁrst that F = ES˜ so that x∗(N) = 0. Then, from (48),
∂Γ/∂m = 0, Hence, from (11), N∗ and thus J∗ = 	N∗
 remain
unchanged with a change in m.
ii. Suppose next that F > ES˜ (F < ES˜) so that x∗(N) > 0
(x∗(N) < 0). Then, from (48), ∂Γ/∂m < 0 (∂Γ/∂m > 0).
Hence, from (11), N∗ and thus J∗ = 	N∗
 are weakly de-
creasing (weakly increasing) along with an increase in m.
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(b) Consider next an increase in r. From (44),
∂Γ
∂r
=
∂q∗(N)
∂r
(P ′(Nq∗(N))Nq∗(N) + P(Nq∗(N))− F )
×
P(0)∫
0
u′(P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)− Fq∗(N) + (F − S)x∗(N)) · ψ(S;m, r)dS
+
∂x∗(N)
∂r
×
P(0)∫
0
(F − S)u′(P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)− Fq∗(N) + (F − S)x∗(N)) · ψ(S;m, r)dS
−
P(0)∫
0
u(P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)− Fq∗(N) + (F − S)x∗(N)) · ∂ψ(S;m, r)
∂r
dS
(49)
where ∂q
∗(N)
∂r
= 0 due to the separation property stated in Re-
mark 3.3, and, from (9),
P(0)∫
0
(F−S)·u′(P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)−Fq∗(N)+(F−S)x∗(N))·ψ(S;m, r)dS = 0.
(50)
Hence, (49) simpliﬁes to
∂Γ
∂r
=
P(0)∫
0
u(P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)−Fq∗(N)+(F−S)x∗(N))·∂ψ(S;m, r)
∂r
dS.
(51)
The sign of (51) is for the moment ambiguous because ∂ψ(S;m,r)
∂m
may be positive or negative depending on the value for S. Inte-
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grating by parts (51) yields
∂Γ
∂r
= u(P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)− Fq∗(N) + (F − S)x∗(N))∂Ψ(S;m, r)
∂r
∣∣∣∣P(0)
0
+ x∗(N)
P(0)∫
0
u′(P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)− Fq∗(N) + (F − S)x∗(N))∂Ψ(S;m, r)
∂r
dS.
(52)
As in (48), the ﬁrst term in (52) is equal to zero. We cannot
sign directly (52) because, by the deﬁnition of a mean-preserving
spread, ∂Ψ(y;m,r)
∂r
may be positive or negative depending on the
value of S. Integrating by parts (52) yields
∂Γ
∂r
= x∗(N) · u′(P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)− Fq∗(N) + (F − S)x∗(N))
×
(∫ S
0
∂Ψ(y;m, r)dy
∂r
)∣∣∣∣P(0)
0
+ (x∗(N))2 ·
∫ P(0)
0
u′′(P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)− Fq∗(N) + (F − S)x∗(N))
×
(∫ S
0
∂Ψ(y;m, r)dy
∂r
)
dS. (53)
Since Ψ(0;m, r) = 0 and Ψ(P(0);m, r) = 1 for all r, the ﬁrst
term in (53) is equal to zero. Moreover, using the deﬁnition of a
mean-preserving spread and the fact that an increase in r induces a
mean-preserving increase in the risk of S˜, it follows that ∂Ψ(S;m,r)
∂r
>
0 for all S < P(0).52 From (53), ∂Γ/∂r < 0 since x∗(N) = 0 (from
F = ES˜) and u′′ < 0. Hence, from (11), N∗ and thus J∗ = 	N∗

are weakly decreasing along with an increase in r.
Proof of Proposition 3.6. Plugging x∗(N) ≡ (1 − ω∗(N))q∗(N) and
52We recall the integral deﬁnition of a mean-preserving spread. Suppose that for x ∈
[a, b], G(x) is a mean-preserving spread ofH(x). Then,
∫ b
a
(G(x)−H(x))dx = 0 to preserve
the same mean between the two distributions and, for all z ∈ [a, b), ∫ za (G(x)−H(x))dx > 0
so that G(x) has more weight in the tails than H(x).
44
u(π) = v(π; ρ) into (11) yields
P(0)∫
0
v(P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)−Fq∗(N) + (F −S)x∗(N); ρ) · φ(S)dS = u(K) (54)
evaluated at N = N∗. Let
Γ ≡
P(0)∫
0
v(P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)− Fq∗(N) + (F − S)x∗(N); ρ) · φ(S)dS (55)
be the left-hand side of (54). From (55),
∂Γ
∂ρ
=
∂q∗(N)
∂ρ
(P ′(Nq∗(N))Nq∗(N) + P(Nq∗(N))− F )
×
P(0)∫
0
v1(P(Nq
∗(N))q∗(N)− Fq∗(N) + (F − S)x∗(N); ρ) · φ(S)dS
+
∂x∗(N)
∂ρ
P(0)∫
0
(F − S) · v1(P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)− Fq∗(N) + (F − S)x∗(N); ρ) · φ(S)dS
+
∫
∂v(P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)− Fq∗(N) + (F − S)x∗(N); ρ)
∂ρ
· φ(S)dS
(56)
where ∂q
∗(N)
∂ρ
= 0 due to the separation property stated in Remark 3.3, and,
from (9),
P(0)∫
0
(F − S) · v1(P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)−Fq∗(N) + (F − S)x∗(N); ρ) · φ(S)dS = 0.
(57)
Hence, (45) simpliﬁes to
∂Γ
∂ρ
=
∫
∂v(P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)− Fq∗(N) + (F − S)x∗(N); ρ)
∂ρ
· φ(S)dS. (58)
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Since an increase in ρ means an increase in risk aversion, it follows that
for F = ES˜, (58) is negative for all N .53 Hence, from (11), N∗ and thus
J∗ = 	N∗
 are weakly decreasing in ρ because a more risk-averse ﬁrm requires
a higher risk premium to remain in the market.
53Since x∗(N) = 0 when F = ES˜, it follows that v is strictly concave in S. Hence, for
any ρ1, ρ2 : ρ2 > ρ1 and as long as x
∗(N) = 0,∫
v(P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)− Fq∗(N) + (F − S)x∗(N); ρ2) · φ(S)dS
<
∫
v(P(Nq∗(N))q∗(N)− Fq∗(N) + (F − S)x∗(N); ρ1) · φ(S)dS. (59)
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